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The Likelihood Principle: Objectivity and the Values and Science Debate 
 
Sean Boivin 
This paper focuses on the debate of underdetermination in science, and asks the descriptive 
question: is objectivity possible in science? I introduce the problem of underdetermination in 
science and articulate a related argument presented by philosopher Helen Longino against the 
possibility for objectivity (traditionally understood) in science. In opposition to Longino, I aim to 
salvage the possibility of important objectivity. I begin from Likelihoodism – a normative view 
about the form that evidential reasoning should take. After presenting different defenses of that 
view, I show how it implies a descriptive claim – the Likelihood Principle – that opposes 
Longino’s cynicism about the descriptive possibility of objectivity in science. The Likelihood 
Principle compares the likelihoods of two hypotheses in relation to a body of evidence and says 
which hypothesis (if any) is consequently favored. I argue that “favours” be interpreted as 
“objectively favours”, implying it is possible for some evidence to objectively favour one 
hypothesis over another without appeal to values. In addition to arguing that we should then infer 
a descriptive objectivism from this, I interpret a case-study using the Likelihood Principle to 
illustrate how applications of it can be objective. I discuss what follows for the debate in the 
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Section 1.1 - Introduction 
A traditional view about values in science says that “non-epistemic” values1 (e.g., ethical, 
political, or religious concerns) can and should play roles only at the periphery of science, 
outside the “context of justification” in which evidence can and should objectively and 
epistemically relate to hypotheses and our beliefs about them.2 In recent years authors have 
challenged this, arguing that moral, social and political values should play a role in the context of 
justification.3 Others have argued that non-epistemic values necessarily influence scientific 
reasoning, and thus justification.4 The more traditional and opposing view that non-epistemic 
values needn’t and shouldn’t have any relevance for assessing the degree to which scientific 
hypotheses are confirmed is dubbed the value-free ideal for science.  
It is now widely accepted that “epistemic” values (e.g., predictive accuracy, explanatory 
power, and consistency) have a legitimate role to play throughout all aspects of scientific 
reasoning.5  Moreover, most scholars agree that “non-epistemic” values can appropriately 
influence many aspects of science, including choices about what projects to pursue, what ethical 
constraints to place on scientific methodologies6 and what counts as a reliable finding.7 Current 
debate among philosophers of science revolves primarily around the question of whether non-
epistemic values also have a legitimate role to play at the center of scientific reasoning.8 
Numerous strategies for answering this question have recently been proposed.9 One is to rely 
strictly on a social account of the nature of science10 and argue that non-epistemic factors have a 
legitimate and unavoidable role to play in evaluating scientific claims because scientific claims 
are underdetermined by purely epistemic considerations.11 For example, in her book Science as 
Social Knowledge, philosopher Helen Longino rejects the value-free ideal for science and argues 
 [2] 
 
that data stand in evidential relationships to theories or hypotheses only in the context of 
auxiliary assumptions that should be collectively assessed against both epistemic and non-
epistemic values. 
I believe that some challenges to the value-free ideal are well-taken and important but also 
that some modest but important objectivity can and should be retained. To more exactly spell this 
out, my paper will first focus on a descriptive question: is objectivity possible in science? I next 
introduce the related issue of underdetermination in science, then present Longino’s arguments 
against the possibility for objectivity (traditionally understood) in science (Section 1.2). In 
opposition to Longino on my descriptive question I argue for an objectivist form of 
Likelihoodism (Section 2). Although this is a normative view about the form that evidential 
reasoning should take, it also implies a descriptive claim – the Likelihood Principle – that 
opposes Longino’s cynicism about the descriptive possibility of objectivity in science. To see 
this, consider what Likelihoodism says:  
If a rational agent is determining what evidential relationship holds between an 
observation, O, a hypothesis, H1, and another hypothesis, H2, then she should do so in 
accord with the Likelihood Principle: O favors H1 over H2 iff P(O|H1) > P(O|H2). 
This clarifies that Likelihoodism, as a normative view about how one should reason in particular 
cases, makes use of the Likelihood Principle, a descriptive claim that says exactly when O does 
and does not favour H1 over H2.12 I will show that this descriptive principle disagrees with 
Longino’s cynicism because we should interpret the favouring it describes as objective. And by 
implying that O objectively favours the hypothesis on which O was more probable, the principle 
implies that such objectivity is, as a matter of descriptive fact, possible.  
 [3] 
 
While arguing in this way, I will be presupposing Likelihoodism is justified and present 
different strategies authors invoke in its defense. In addition to arguing that we should then infer 
a descriptive objectivism from this, I interpret a case-study using the Likelihood Principle 
(Section 4), in order to illustrate how applications of it can be objective. I discuss what follows 
for the debate in the values and science literature, including what follows with respect to 
Longino’s views. Authors have not appreciated the problems that Likelihoodism poses for 
criticisms of the value-free ideal. 
Section 1.2 - Longino and Underdetermination 
The descriptive question about whether objectivity is possible in science is often 
addressed within debate about so-called underdetermination, which concerns the role of auxiliary 
assumptions in scientific reasoning about hypotheses and evidence. It is now widely appreciated 
that for nearly any particular scientific hypothesis, observations alone are not enough to 
determine whether the hypothesis is supported.13 Observations themselves leave the issue of the 
hypothesis’ support underdetermined. This is because it is very rare for a hypothesis to all by 
itself make predictions about which observations will be obtained. To make predictions, 
hypotheses nearly always must be conjoined with auxiliary assumptions. For instance, the 
hypothesis that stormy weather is caused by falling air pressure does not, by itself, predict that a 
barometer reading will be observed to fall when a storm rolls in. To make that prediction, we 
must add the following sort of auxiliary assumptions to the hypothesis: the barometer is working 
correctly, observations of the barometer are accurate, the barometer and the storm are within the 
same weather system, etc. When a prediction fails, this suggests a problem somewhere in the 
total package of hypothesis + auxiliary assumptions, but the failure alone is silent about where in 
the package the problem resides. Suppose we consult a barometer as a storm rolls in, and observe 
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that it is not falling. The hypothesis about stormy weather plus usual auxiliary assumptions fail to 
predict this. But whether this evidentially counts against the hypothesis in particular, or against it 
plus some of the auxiliary assumptions, or against just some of those assumptions, is left so far 
undetermined. Perhaps the barometer is in a climate controlled room, in a house in the storm, 
such that the problem resides solely with the assumption that the barometer and the storm are 
within the same weather system. 
It is common for authors to move from those widely accepted points about 
underdetermination, to the following line of argument. If some observation objectively favors a 
particular hypothesis, then it is possible to isolate the hypothesis and each of the associated 
auxiliary assumptions and exhaustively test or otherwise justify each of these individually. But it 
is not possible to do that. Therefore, an observation cannot objectively favour a hypothesis.14  
This argument is supposed to apply to all sciences but is most prevalently discussed in 
connection with the human and social sciences. Helen Longino leverages it in her 1990 book, 
while referring to auxiliary assumptions as background beliefs. She argues that if background 
beliefs are necessary to bridge the gap between evidence and hypotheses, so that what in fact 
counts as evidence is relativized to background beliefs, then hypothesis acceptance on the basis 
of evidence is also in fact relativized.15 She realizes that an infinite regress then threatens: to 
strengthen evidence so that it justifies accepting a hypothesis, we will often need to test the 
background beliefs with respect to which existing evidence is relativized; but to do that for the 
background beliefs, we will have to rely on and test still other background beliefs, and so on.  
But Longino claims science can and often does effectively address this threat of regress 
via contextual empiricism. This view notes that science is conducted within a social context, 
wherein background assumptions are articulated, accessed, and scrutinized from distinct and 
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complimentary points of view by a diverse community of scientists, philosophers and others. 
Mechanisms of peer review allow for this, for example. Longino posits that such intersubjective 
mechanisms are key for the rationality of science, rather than subject-independent objectivity. 
Such objectivity was traditionally thought furnished by having evidence alone, independent of 
judgments by subjects, determine the support or lack thereof for hypotheses. Longino believes 
the underdetermination problem shows that objectivity in that traditional sense is impossible. Not 
only does she then advise that we then turn instead to intersubjective mechanisms to help secure 
rationality in science, but also she implies that we should change what we mean by ‘objective’ so 
that it no longer refers to the traditional subject-independent concept and instead refers to the 
intersubjective concept.16 She believes that diversity in values held by different subjects of 
scientific communities is important for achieving increasing degrees of objectivity (understood 
in her new sense) via the social mechanisms she clarifies.  
Longino further develops a conception of scientific practice in her 2002 book The Fate of 
Knowledge, claiming that, traditionally understood, science aims to accept true statements, and 
often succeeds in this. But philosophers have typically thought that scientists do and should 
attempt to achieve this aim individualistically, with acceptance by the scientific community 
being acceptance by the individuals who comprise that community. Her alternative conclusion 
draws from her 1990 book: acceptance of scientific statements is instead the result of important 
interactions between subjects within the scientific community, through debate, collaboration, 
instruction, and so forth.  
Accordingly, Longino proposes to amend the notion of rules of method in science 
traditionally understood. She thinks the traditional rules of method were originally adopted on 
the basis of the belief that following them reliably generates and sustains true beliefs. To this, 
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Longino adds that there are rules governing the interactions among scientists as well, and she 
proposes four ideal norms that, when taken together, she thinks address the problem of 
underdetermination: public venues for criticism; uptake of criticism; publicly recognized 
standards for evaluating theories, hypotheses and observation practices; and tempered equality 
across class, genders and communities.17 Background beliefs surviving critical scrutiny under 
these conditions satisfy the notion Longino calls “epistemic acceptability”: a combination of the 
empiricist notion of justification by empirical data and the social norms applying to interaction 
within communities that constitutes reasoning.18 Longino thinks that operating in accord with the 
four ideal norms she presents is what it means to be objective (in her sense) and thinks of these 
norms as hypotheticals, rather than categorical.19 Longino labels her view “sociopragmatism”, a 
parent view that includes but also expands upon her view of contextual empirism I introduced 
above. Per this parent view, knowledge is partial and reflects a point of view, is plural with 
different practices producing different sorts of knowledge about the same phenomenon, is 
provisional,20 and does not assume either monism or pluralism but is open to the possibility of 
even a strong form of pluralism in which different background assumptions could lead to 
incompatible and irreconcilable versions of the same phenomenon. 
More recently in her 2013 book, while focused on examples from contemporary research 
programs studying human aggression and sexuality, she argues for a strong pluralism in which 
background assumptions lead researchers to incompatible and irreconcilable versions of the same 
phenomenon. Devoting one chapter to each of the different research programs on human 
sexuality and aggression that she considers, Longino cites the concepts, methodologies and 




A main claim in her argument is that the theories embedded within a research program 
are irreconcilable and empirically incommensurable with theories embedded in other research 
programs.21 She argues this is because even while different research programs may be attempting 
to answer the same general question (i.e., What is the cause of human aggression and sexuality?), 
theories embedded within each program rely on different background assumptions, employ 
different evidence-gathering procedures and data-interpretation techniques, use different 
theoretical concepts than theories embedded within other research programs, and possess 
different research aims. For example, quantitative behavioral genetics (QBG) focuses on the 
whole genome, as well as shared and nonshared environmental factors, while drawing upon twin 
studies and adoption studies (MZ/DZ comparisons) to infer heritability estimates for a given 
trait. Developmental systems theorists, in contrast, treat prior states of entire developmental 
systems as causes of changes of state in those systems, and they rely mostly on animal subjects 
for testing while focusing primarily on species specific traits.22 Social-environmental approaches 
are a third type and focus on more fine-grained environmental factors (within what QBG calls 
“non-shared environment”), often with the aim of determining the effectiveness of social 
interventions rather than the underlying causes and with the primary research aim of justifying 
social work and clinical psychology.  
Due to this heterogeneity of research programs (the use of different background 
assumptions, methodologies, research aims, experimental designs, data interpretation techniques 
and so on) many research programs are, according to Longino, incompatible with one another 
and cannot be simply integrated into a single fundamental account. More importantly, such 
incompatibilities reveal how different and incompatible standards for evaluating evidence are in 
use across research programs, rendering them empirically incommensurable. An important 
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implication Longino draws from this is that scrutinizing evidence can only occur from within the 
research program that produced it, denying the possibility for cross-approach empirical 
evaluation.23 The resulting picture Longino paints for her readers is that each research program 
provides only partial knowledge from the purview of a particular set of parts that together 
comprise a research program.24 More importantly, “better” knowledge is produced by “[r]efining 
and improving methods” within a particular program, but any disagreement or contradiction 
across research programs cannot be settled by evidence.25  
To the extent that she thinks high degrees of objectivity are achievable only when values 
play roles in the research questions being asked, and in the kinds of experiments being conducted 
and data sets collected, she gives an answer to my descriptive question of whether objectivity is 
possible in science – Longino believes that in the vast majority of cases, it is not possible for 
evidence to objectively favor a hypothesis, unless by the term “objectively” we include appeal to 
a diverse set of values that interact as checks and balances. To respond to Longino’s challenges, 
in the next section I discuss the Likelihoodist alternative to Longino’s views, an alternative that 
preserves a role for a more traditional concept of objectivity in science.  
Section 2.1: Likelihoodism 
This section discusses the reasons for believing Likelihoodism is true and that its 
prescription can, when followed, yield support for hypotheses that is objective. I argue that the 
reasons for believing Likelihoodism is true imply that we also have reason to believe some 
applications of the Likelihood Principle reveal objective favouring relations.26 This is because of 
how Likelihoodism makes use of the Likelihood Principle, and the nature of that principle. 
Where O is some data, H1 is one hypothesis, and H2 is another hypothesis, the 
Likelihood Principle says: 
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O favors H1 over H2 iff: Pr(O|H1) > Pr(O|H2)27 
In part, the Likelihood Principle says that if an event is more probable under H1 than H2, then 
occurrence of that event is evidence supporting H1 over H2. An application of the Principle 
compares the Likelihoods of two hypotheses in relation to data and says which hypothesis (if 
any) is consequently favored by those data.28 Take for example the following two hypotheses: “it 
will rain tomorrow in Montreal” and “it will be clear and sunny all day tomorrow in Montreal”. 
Assign “H1” as the former hypothesis and “H2” as the latter. Now say that at ten o’clock today, 
reliably sourced meteorological data and models give a forecast that there is an eighty-percent 
chance of rain tomorrow and a twenty-percent chance of no rain tomorrow. Let “O” be the 
weather forecast. In such a case, applying the Likelihood Principle says that O favours H1 over 
H2, since H1 predicts that a reliable forecast will call for a strong chance of rain. The Likelihood 
Principle gives exact expression to our powerful intuition that says an observation is evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that, of those compared, predicted the observation more strongly. On 
such grounds the principle has been defended at length as a general tool for both formal and 
informal reasoning about hypothesis ranking.29  
The concept of objectivity that interests me is epistemic. It is about whether data, such as 
O, support the truth of some hypothesis over another in an objective sense. Is such objectivity of 
support possible in science? Let's assume O is some collected data that accurately represents the 
world as intended. Also assume that O is in fact more probable according to H1 than to H2, and 
so the Likelihood Principle implies that O favours H1 over H2. Now, what further condition(s) 
suffice(s) along with those assumptions for the favouring relation to be objective – for the 
favouring to amount to H1 being objectively supported over H2 by O? Here is a further condition 
that I propose to be sufficient (given the other assumptions) for such objectivity of favouring: O 
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would favour H1 over H2 even if all parties involved denied this after accepting that O is 
accurate as intended and is more probable on H1 than H2.  
The forecast for rain example can illustrate this condition. Assume that O, the forecast 
expecting rain, accurately represents the predictions to come from the weather data and models. 
And because those data and models are reliable, their indication of rain is more probable on the 
hypothesis that it will rain tomorrow (H1) than on the hypothesis that it will be clear and sunny 
all day (H2). So the Likelihood Principle implies that O favours H1 over H2. Now imagine that 
everybody who learns of the forecast denies that it favours rain tomorrow. They accept that the 
forecast accurately reflects the data and models, and that the forecast is more probable on the 
hypothesis of rain tomorrow. But they uniformly deny that this is enough for the forecast to be 
evidence that favours the truth of the hypothesis of rain tomorrow. On my proposals, if the 
forecast nonetheless would still favour the hypothesis of rain, despite the uniform denial of this, 
then this favouring is objective: O is objectively supporting the truth of H1 over the truth of H2.  
In contrast, if instead there would be no such favouring upon people uniformly denying 
such favouring, it would seem the favouring wasn’t objective after all. But I will remain agnostic 
on this point. I am proposing my condition as sufficient in such cases for objectivity, while 
setting aside whether it is also necessary.  
The criterion of (sufficient condition for) objectivity I have formulated and will defend 
here is important because much of the literature of values and science focuses on novel concepts 
of objectivity that do away with many of the traditional distinctions between the discovery, 
justification, and application aspects of science. The criterion I propose is also one that authors 
like Longino imply is impossible to satisfy. And so if successful, I will have defended modest 
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but important objectivity that has been overlooked or discarded too quickly within the science 
and values literature. 
Section 2.2: The Likelihood Principle 
One way of satisfying the criterion of objectivity I proposed is by applying the 
Likelihood Principle, which is a descriptive component of Likelihoodism. As will clarify, 
Likelihoodism also contains a normative component, saying that a person who is reasoning 
evidentially should reason in accord with the Likelihood Principle when the conditions for that 
principle’s application hold. By way of actual examples and thought experiments, I will show 
how this view fits our least controversial judgments in certain cases better than rival approaches. 
I summarize how other authors implement this strategy when arguing for the truth of 
Likelihoodism, and I judge that they have thereby provided adequate defense of Likelihoodism 
over rival approaches. With our reasons for believing Likelihoodism thus clarified, my key claim 
is that we thereby also have reason to believe (even if we did not previously appreciate this) that 
applications of the Likelihood Principle can reveal favouring relations that are objective in the 
sense captured by my criterion of objectivity. This is because of how the Likelihood Principle is 
a component of Likelihoodism. 
Section 2.3: Likelihoodism as Justified 
So what are the reasons to believe Likelihoodism? 
The most decisive type of defense that authors have provided for the Likelihood Principle 
is a mathematical proof. But this is a very particular goal-relative proof. The proof shows that if 
your goal is to determine which of two models is more predicatively accurate in a specified 
technical sense, then applying the Likelihood Principle is the way to achieve this goal.30  
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When turning to a more general defense of the Likelihoodism that is not restricted to the 
goal of achieving a technical sort of predictive accuracy, two general strategies are available. 
One strategy is by way of actual examples and thought experiments. This involves arguing that 
Likelihoodism best systematizes judged examples. It compares our judgements about the 
evidence within a range of cases and shows how Likelihoodism does the best job at capturing our 
judgements in those cases.  
The other general strategy for defending Likelihoodism resembles strategies in meta-
ethics: you ask what is it that makes Likelihoodism true. The idea is to show that Likelihoodism 
is made true independently of our proclivities, by some real feature of the world that includes the 
Likelihood Principle. This strategy – a kind of meta-epistemics –  is not one I employ. For the 
purposes of my paper, I adopt the former strategy.  
There are two main alternatives to Likelihoodism. One is Bayesianism, which is 
compatible with some but not all parts of Likelihoodism, and the other is Frequentism such as 
significance testing, which is quite different from Likelihoodism. These are the two main 
alternatives to check Likelihoodism against, when claiming it is the best of available views31. 
The Bayesianism approach involves interpreting how data bear on hypotheses. Central to 
Bayesianism is Bayes’ theorem, a mathematical theorem derived from the axioms of Probability 
theory. Where O is some data, H1 is one hypothesis and (H | O) is the probability of a hypothesis 
given some observation, Bayes Theorem says:  
Pr(H | O) = [Pr(H) Pr(O | H)] / Pr(O) 
Bayes’ theorem derives a posterior probability by multiplying the prior probability of H (i.e., 
Pr(H)) by the probability of the observation given the hypothesis (i.e., Pr(O|H)), then dividing by 
the prior probability of the observation (i.e., Pr(O)). Bayesianism is an epistemology that adds to 
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the merely mathematical Bayes’ theorem. Bayesianism proposes that the posterior probability be 
understood as what your updated degree of belief in the hypothesis should be as you acquire new 
evidence. Bayesianism says: 
O confirms H if and only if Pr(H | O) > Pr(H) 
O disconfirms H if and only if Pr(H | O) < Pr(H) 
O is conformationally irrelevant to H iff Pr(H | O) = Pr(H) 
Bayesian confirmation is probabilistic, not dichotomous; it tells you how probably true or false a 
belief is, rather than simply asserting that it is true or that it is false. And as new observations 
come in, it tells you how these probabilities change, how you should change your degrees of 
belief. Confirmation (and disconfirmation) then involves comparing new and old degrees of 
belief.  
Those who employ Bayesianism think it is an objective way of updating the probability 
of or degree of belief in a theory when certain conditions are met32. For example, imagine you’re 
a doctor determining whether your patient has tuberculosis. Prior to administering a diagnostic 
test, you examine the patient and refer to frequency data concerning the prevalence of 
tuberculosis in the population to which the patient belongs. Say the disease is very rare, 1 in 
1000, and the chance of error for the diagnostic test as either a false positive or false negative is 
extremely low, .01. Given these values, the posterior probabilities of Pr(tuberculosis | + result) 
and Pr(no tuberculosis | - result) are both large. The objectivity of the quantities that figure into 
the question of whether your patient has tuberculosis is apparent. When we say: 
Pr( no-tubercolusis | - result ) > Pr( tubercolusis | - result),  
it is not merely that we hope that the one probability is of greater value than the other one, but 
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that the one probability really is greater than the other. As Sober states, “the objective 
component is substantial and compelling”.33  
Bayesianism can be a useful way of justifying the degrees of belief we should have in 
scientific theories or results of reliable34 diagnostic tests.  But there are many cases where 
applying Bayes’ theorem is problematic. When the data for estimating values of prior 
probabilities come from small or unrepresentative samples, scientists lack ground for reaching a 
justified consensus on what values to assign to the priors using the data alone. In these cases, 
some become critical of Bayesianism and its reliance on assigning values to priors. But there is a 
fallback position. It contains only some of the strengths of Bayesianism, to which one can retreat 
when the weaknesses of assigning priors make it wise to abandon Bayesianism. That position is 
Likelihoodism.  
To briefly recall some of Section 1, Likelihoodism proposes the use of the Likelihood 
Principle and is a normative epistemic claim about how a person should reason evidentially. It 
says: 
If a rational agent is determining what evidential relationship holds between O, H1 and 
H2, then she should do so in accord with the Likelihood Principle, i.e., she should believe 
that O favors H1 over H2 iff  Pr(O|H1) > Pr(O|H2). 
With this in mind, let us proceed to examples and thought experiments. 
Consider Modus Tollens:  
If H, then O. 
Not O_________ 
Therefore, not H. 
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Modus Tollens is a form of deductive inference. The first premise in an instance of this inference 
says that H is sufficient for O, and implies that O is necessary for H. Many forms of deductive 
inference similarly involve or imply statements of necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, or 
both. Popper’s idea of falsifiability centers on Modus Tollens, using that inference to reject a 
hypothesis when a test fails to produce an observation entailed by the hypothesis. According to 
Popper, a hypothesis is falsifiable if and only if it is refutable by some conceivable observation. 
In contrast to Modus Tollens, consider another form of deductive inference, Modus Ponens. It 
says: 
If O, then H. 
O. _______   
H. 
The first premise in Modus Ponens says O is sufficient for H. But in Popper’s view, science is 
strictly prohibitive; a hypothesis can be falsified given a genuine counter-instance, but it is 
exceedingly rare for a hypothesis to be logically verified in virtue of Modus Ponens inference. 
This is because Modus Ponens involves stating that an observation deductively entails some 
hypothesis and yet observations very rarely entail the hypotheses that scientists test. 
Observations are typically deductively compatible with alternative hypotheses as well. As for 
Modus Tollens, it is now well-understood that scientific theories are rarely falsified on the basis 
of a single observation.35 Just as observations rarely entail a hypothesis, a hypothesis rarely 
entails certain observations or the negation of them; in other words, the first premise in scientific 
applications of Modus Tollens would typically be false. So disconfirmation (and confirmation) in 
the context of scientific theories is better understood in probabilistic terms. Hypotheses make 
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certain observations more or less probable, rather than entailing them or their negations. This 
raises the question: can we turn to probabilistic versions of Modus Tollens and Modus Ponens?  
The Lottery Paradox36 shows us that we ought to be wary of using probabilistic versions of 
Modus Ponens in testing a hypothesis.37 But interestingly, Probabilistic Modus Ponens has a 
close cousin. Here I express it as the updating rule within Bayesianism: 
(Update Rule) 
 Prtime 1(H | O) is very high 
O 
O is all the evidence we have gathered between time 1 and time 2. 
Prtime 2(H) is very high.  
But some authors have endorsed the probabilistic version of Modus Tollens as a method of 
evidential reasoning. Prob-MT says: 
Pr(O | H) is very high 
 Not O_____________ 
 Not H. 
Prob-MT requires the setting of a probability cutoff for the rejection of a hypothesis, and 
presumably, a justification for it. For instance, Richard Dawkins argues the probabilistic cutoff 
for theories pertaining to the origin of life on earth involves the number, n, of planets in the 




argues, should be rejected. The creationist Henry Morris proposes we assign theories which posit 




 .39 Meanwhile intelligent design theorist William Dembski assigns those same 
theories that Morris addresses with a probability cutoff of 
1
10150
 .40  
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But regardless of choice of cut-off, Prob-MT is an invalid form of inference. The 
invalidity stems from the conjunction of the probabilities of different observations over time.41 If 
H confers a very high probability (though less than unity) on each of the observations O1, O2, 
…, O1000, it will confer a very low probability on their conjunction, assuming the observations 
are independent of each other conditional on H. Applying Prob-MT to scientific theories would 
render them with a very low probability after much testing, and eliminate virtually all well tested 
theories from science.42  
An underlying lesson from these problems with different types of inference is that 
support for a hypothesis is better understood contrastively.43 To see why, consider the following 
thought experiment: 
Suppose I send my valet to bring my urn containing 100 balls, of which only two are 
white. I draw one ball and find that it is white. Is this evidence against the hypothesis that 
he has brought the correct urn? And is p = 0.02 a proper measure of the strength of this 
evidence? Suppose that I keep in my urn vault two urns, one with two white balls and 
another, identical in appearance, that contains no white balls. Now is my observation of a 
white ball evidence that he has not brought the right urn? Fisher’s disjunction still applies 
– either a rare event has occurred or the null hypothesis (correct) is false. But although 
the observation of a white ball is rare under the null hypothesis, it is even rarer under the 
alternative (wrong urn). In this case, the observation is actually strong evidence in favour 
of the null hypothesis.44 
The thought experiment illuminates an important idea about hypothesis testing: the better 
evidential reasoning approach to hypothesis testing tests a hypothesis against another hypothesis. 
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Testing is essentially a comparative process in which one tries to find observations that favour 
one hypothesis over another.45 
Prob-MT fails because it is not a comparative approach. And in addition to being an 
invalid form of reasoning under the conditions stated above, Prob-MT suffers from multiple 
counts of arbitrariness or subjectivism. To examine this subjectivism, I begin with some 
terminology. Prob-MT is a form of significance testing. Significance testing was proposed by R. 
A. Fisher46 as a corrective measure for issues he saw in the Neyman-Person theory of hypothesis 
testing (discussion below).  A hypothesis tested using significance testing is called the null 
hypothesis. This testing utilizes two values, the p-value and α value. The p-value is defined in 
terms of the actual observation produced by a test and other observations that were possible but 
didn’t come about. But the p-value doesn’t concern all possible observations. Rather it is the 
probability the test had of producing the actual observation or any of the other possible 
observations that were at least as improbable as the actual observation, if the null hypothesis is 
true. So it is the probability of a disjunction of actual and possible observations, conditional on 
the null hypothesis. If the hypothesis is true, what was the probability of attaining either the 
actual observation or any other that was at least as improbable? The answer equals the p-value.  
The α value marks a conventionally chosen cut-off point, which is applied to the p-value. 
There are two interpretations of this. One interpretation is a yes-or-no affair; it says that if the p-
value of the actual test outcome falls somewhere below the α value, then the null hypothesis 
should be rejected. The second interpretation introduces a matter of degree; it says that the lower 
the p-value is, the stronger the evidence against it, and that the α value marks the line between 
evidence against the null hypothesis being strong vs. not strong.  
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Both interpretations suffer from multiple counts of arbitrariness. Choosing a value for α 
is generally conceded as an arbitrary matter of convention. But how the outcome space for a 
significance test is carved up is also arbitrary, and some ways of carving in a given case can lead 
to the verdict that we reject (or have strong evidence against) the null, while other ways of 
carving oppositely imply that we do not reject (or do not have strong evidence against) the null. 
Howson and Urbach47 provide the example of testing the null hypothesis that a coin is fair by 
flipping it 20 times. One way to carve up the space of possible outcomes is to say that getting 0 
heads in 20 tosses is one possible outcome, getting 1 head in 20 tosses is another possible 
outcome, and so on. A different way to carve up the space is to say that getting 0 or 1 heads is 
one possible outcome, getting 1 or 2 heads is another possible outcome, and so on. Howson and 
Urbach show that on one such specification of the outcome space, and where α is set at 0.05, an 
actual outcome of 6 heads in 20 tosses would imply rejecting the hypothesis that the coin is fair, 
while on a different specification this same actual outcome and same value for α would imply 
not rejecting the hypothesis. The prospects for avoiding arbitrariness when opting for one 
carving rather than another, including prospects that appeal to some notion of the “most natural 
carving”, are bleak.48 
This example also shows that descriptions of the actual and possible data can come in 
varying degrees of logical strength, which relates to an additional problem. If significance testers 
insist on the logically strongest interpretation of data in each case, this can artificially result in p-
values of unity, which would artificially (and thus illegitimately) protect a null hypothesis from 
ever being rejected by the chosen test. The problem is then a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
widely accepted principle of total evidence implies that any interpretation of a test should take 
account of everything we know, which implies using the logically strongest description of the 
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data; but we have just seen that if significance testers use such a description, they can entail 
illegitimate results. On the other hand, if they instead avoid such illegitimacy by sometimes 
opting against the logically strongest description of the data, then they must sometimes violate 
the principle of total evidence. The structure of significance testing ensures that this testing 
cannot always legitimately follow that principle.49  Bayesianism, and more importantly, 
Likelihoodism, do conform with the principle of total evidence, and without entailing any 
illegitimacies.50 
Hereafter I presume that comparing Likelihoodism to its rivals by way of examples 
provides an adequate defense for believing Likelihoodism is true. The reasons for believing the 
normative advice stated by Likelihoodism typically consist in reasons for thinking applications 
of the Likelihood Principle produce more objective epistemic verdicts than produced by applying 
the tools of Likelihoodism’s rivals. These reasons for believing Likelihoodism are thereby also 
reasons for believing some applications of its Likelihood Principle are objective – that they 
satisfy my objective condition.  
Section 2.3.1: Inductive Risk and Royall’s Three Questions 
There are other important (albeit less technical) considerations involving subjective 
cutoffs in science concerning versions of the argument from “inductive risk”. The term 
“inductive risk” was coined by Hempel51 and the argument is most commonly attributed to 
Richard Rudner.52 Heather Douglas has recently developed her own version53 and related 
arguments on what she calls the direct and indirect roles of values in science.54 Simply put, the 
argument from inductive risk starts by noting that because science does not produce theories that 
are guaranteed to be absolutely true, there will always be a risk of error. Given the social aim not 
to inflict harm upon people, if some scientific theories produce evidence that is used to decide 
 [21] 
 
whether some (for example) potentially hazardous chemical is safe, then there is reason to hold 
evidence about potentially hazardous substances to a higher standard of evaluation. But we avoid 
hazards because of our values, so this line of reasoning suggests that we determine thresholds for 
“sufficient evidence” by appeal to values.  
In discussing that argument, authors of the science and values literature often draw a 
distinction between concepts of belief and acceptance.55 Bayesianism, as we have already seen, 
says how you should change your degrees of belief as new observations come in. But there is a 
third concept that we can invoke when reasoning evidentially: evidential favouring. We have 
also discussed how favoring is an integral part to Likelihoodism. Statistician Richard Royall 
helpfully distinguishes between the concepts of acceptance, belief, and the concept of evidential 
favouring. In his 1997 book Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm, Royall poses three 
questions concerning what scientists may want to address when evaluating observations: 
1. What should you do? 
2. What should you believe? 
3. What do the observations tell you about the hypotheses you’re considering? 
Question (1) falls in the domain of decision theory in which utilities (or non-epistemic 
considerations) as well as probabilities need to be considered, and relates most strongly to the 
arguments from inductive risk. Question (2), Royall thinks, is best suited for Bayesianism when 
certain conditions are met (see the discussion above on Bayesianism). And question (3) falls in 
the province of Likelihoodism and its Likelihood Principle. Through appealing only to evidential 
considerations, Likelihoodism does not tell us what we should believe (or whether we should 
accept a theory). Instead, it merely tells us what the evidence says and precludes using the 
candidate definitions of degree of confirmation, as previously noted.56  
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Parsing things in this way helps clarify the modesty of the objectivity being proposed. 
Some applications of the Likelihood Principle that satisfy my objective condition will be 
restricted to a part of scientific practice that is different from those parts dealing with inductive 
risk, for instance. But distinguishing questions that scientists may pose also helps focus the 
debate on the descriptive argument I am making: if indeed the sorts of arguments for 
Likelihoodism (versus its competitors) that I have summarized give us reasons for believing 
Likelihoodism, as I have suggested, then – even if Likelihoodism is false without our knowing it 
– we thereby also have reasons for believing that applications of the Likelihood Principle can be 
objective in the sense I have identified. We have reason to interpret “favours” within the 
Likelihoodist framework as “objectively favours”. 
Section 3.1: A Case Study 
This section interprets a case-study using the Likelihood Principle, in order to illustrate 
how applications of it can be objective as I have argued. The case study involves two research 
approaches studying human aggressive behavior: a molecular genetics (MG) approach and a 
genetic/environmental (GE) approach.  
Section 3.2: Applying the Likelihood Principle 
The MG and the GE approaches compete to explain the primary cause of human 
aggression. More specifically, both research approaches attempt to answer the question of 
whether low brain activity of the enzyme monoamine oxidose A (MAOA) is a primary cause of 
trait aggression in human behavior. Trait aggression is defined as “an enduring disposition 
toward physical assault”.57 Research in human behavior has focused on the enzyme MAOA and 
two MAOA genotypes because a primary function of the MAOA enzyme is to metabolize types 
of neurotransmitters in the brain and other organs.  
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Now to present the MG research approach and the hypotheses that it aims to test.   
One study conducted by the MG approach focuses on the men of a family with a rare genetic 
mutation, resulting in deletion in the gene encoding for MAOA. The researchers - Brunner and 
colleagues - conducting the study observed that the brothers of the family with the rare genetic 
mutation exhibited mental deficiencies and an inability to regulate impulsive aggressive 
behavior, while females within the family with the mutation had normal intelligence and normal 
behavior.58 The hypothesis H1, that the MG approach is testing is: 
 
H1: In most adult men with trait aggression, low MAOA genotype is the primary cause of 
their aggressive behavior. 
 
In contrast, proponents of the GE approach endorse the following competing hypothesis: 
 
H2: In most adult men with trait aggression, low MAOA genotype is not the primary 
cause of their aggressive behavior. 
 
They endorse this competing hypothesis because they interpret their studies as giving them 
reason to believe that the MAOA genotype’s causal influence is dependent on early childhood 
exposures to violence, and especially experience of child abuse. This is something to which H1 
from the MG approach is not sensitive; that hypothesis presupposes that low MAOA genotype is 




This clarifies in a GE study focused on a birth cohort of 1,037 children (52% male) 
assessed at ages 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18 and 21.59 Subjects are grouped according to low and 
high MAOA genotypes. Those two groups are each sub-divided into “No Childhood 
Maltreatment” (64%), “Probable Maltreatment” (28%) and “Severe Maltreatment” (8%). Data is 
sourced using methods appropriate to each stage of development (e.g., clinical diagnoses, 
personality checklists, individuals nominated by each subject that “…knows you well”, DSM-IV 
assessments, official convictions records).  In each of the six participant sub-groups, four 
dependent variables are measured or assessed: (A) Conduct Disorder, (B) Disposition Towards 
Violence, (C) Anti-Social Personality Disorder symptoms (z scores) and (D) Convicted for 
Violent Offence.  
Within this study, the competing hypotheses make competing predictions:   
 
H1 Prediction: Men with low MAOA genotype and no childhood maltreatment, and men 
with low MAOA genotype and severe childhood maltreatment, will probably score 
similarly – both relatively high – in the categories of (A) Conduct Disorder and (B) 
Disposition Towards Violence.  
 
H2 Prediction: Men with low MAOA genotype and no childhood maltreatment and men 
with low MAOA genotype and severe childhood maltreatment will probably score 
differently – low and high respectively – in the categories of (A) Conduct Disorder and 




For each hypothesis to generate its prediction, it must be conjoined with various background 
assumptions, which I will collectively call ‘Auxil1’ for the MG approach and ‘Auxil2’ for the GE 
approach. In the actual experiments of the MG and GE approaches, these include estimates about 
potential experimental error and the effectiveness of controls. Additionally, the conclusions 
drawn from both tests which are causal and not merely correlational, include the assumption that 
the correlated factor is independent of the behavioral trait under investigation and that there is 
not a common cause of both.60 At the very least, both approaches must assume that they allow 
other causal influences, but that other such influences are not among the primary ones. 
 Having generated the two conflicting predictions, the two hypotheses can be compared in 
terms of the following observation, gathered in the GE study:  
 
O: Men with low MAOA genotype and no childhood maltreatment score low in (A) and 
(B), and men with low MAOA genotype and severe childhood maltreatment score high 
in (A) and (B). 
 




Clearly, O bears out the H2 prediction much better than the H1 prediction. To put this in 
Likelihoodist terms, H2+Auxil2 conferred a higher probability on O than H1+Auxil1 did: 
Pr(O|H1+Auxil1) < Pr(O|H2+Auxil2). Thus according to the Likelihood Principle, obtaining O 
then favoured H2+Auxil2 over H1+Auxil1. 
Section 3.3: Objective Favouring 
The case-study is an illustration of the application of the Likelihood Principle. My 
objectivism implies that the favouring of H2 over H1 by O is an objective favouring of exactly 
the sort specified in my objectivity condition from Section 2. Suppose that O from the case study 
accurately represents the world as intended, and suppose O is in fact more probable according to 
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H2+Auxil2 than to H1+Auxil1. Now imagine all researchers involved agreed with those two 
suppositions, but also all denied that O favours H2+Auxil2 over H1+Auxil1. (Perhaps their denial 
is motivated by how the advancement of egalitarian political goals would be better served by 
believing that the study results imply that O favours H1+Auxil1 over H2+Auxil2.) My position 
implies that this curious denial would be mistaken. Under the conditions I propose to be 
sufficient for objective favouring, O really would favour H2+Auxil2 over H1+Auxil1, despite the 
uniform denial of this. After all, within this particular testing contest, it is H2+Auxil2 that 
predicted O much more strongly.   
Section 4.1: Objection 
Given Longino’s views summarized in Section 1.1 above, Longino would likely object to 
my argument by claiming the objectivity I propose is illusory. The favouring relations within the 
Likelihood framework depend on auxiliary assumptions that we could never exhaustively test or 
otherwise justify. Typically, an observation favours one hypothesis over another partly in virtue 
of the content of background assumptions that helped ensure the hypotheses lent different 
probabilities to the observation – predicted it to different degrees. Longino’s view implies that 
any such favouring is objective only if we could independently justify all involved background 
assumptions, and she claims we cannot meet this demand. More formally, I will express 
Longino’s objection as consisting in this regress argument:61 
1. If: 
a. applications of the Likelihood Principle depend on inferring predictions from 
pairs of compared hypotheses, and 
b. the compared hypotheses typically must each be paired with many auxiliary 
assumptions in order to make predictions, and 
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c. independently justifying each and every auxiliary assumption serving the 
predictions would typically result in infinite regresses of justifications,  
then when application of the Likelihood Principle implies that an observation favours one 
hypothesis over another, this favouring is typically not objective.   
2. Claim 1a is true.  
3. Claim 1b is true. 
4. Claim 1c is true. 
____________________________________________________ 
5. When application of the Likelihood Principle implies that an observation favours one 
hypothesis over another, this favouring is typically not objective. 
 
To illustrate this argument on Longino’s behalf, let us consider how research approaches 
such as MG and GE can and often do draw upon complementary research programs in order to 
independently justify the background assumptions they use.  
Such research approaches typically employ their own distinct set of auxiliary assumptions to 
help them arrive at their respective predictions. Some assumptions will be shared across 
competing research approaches, and some not. And while some are necessary for the predictions 
generated, others may not be necessary (e.g., different assumption could be subbed in for them, 
generating the same prediction) but are endorsed for one reason or another and do, in 
combination with other assumptions used, affect the estimates of the magnitudes of 
Pr(O|H1+Auxil1) and Pr(O|H2+Auxil2).  
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As briefly intimated above, one example of assumptions that research approaches employ are 
methodological assumptions. Research approaches studying human behaviour often employ 
assumptions about the degree of reliability of DNA extraction62 and sequencing63 techniques, the 
validity of questionnaire manuals64 and size and composition of their sample in relation to the 
target population. Usually, some methodological assumptions are highlighted by the authors as 
limitations of the study. And some methodological assumptions may be shared across research 
approaches while others may not. 
An example of a set of methodological assumptions the GE approach employs that can affect 
the magnitudes of Pr(O|H1+Auxil1) and Pr(O|H2+Auxil2), and that are absent in the set of 
methodological assumptions employed by the MG approach, involve the conceptualization of 
indicators of environmental risk for developing aggressive behaviour. In the GE approach, 
conduct disorder is measured according to the DSM-IV. But changing the indicators of the 
environmental risk for developing conduct disorder can change the magnitudes of 
Pr(O|H1+Auxil1) and Pr(O|H2+Auxil2). This is illustrated by Foley et al. when they attempted 
to replicate the GE approach results while employing similar but distinct methodological 
assumptions. In their study, comprising 514 white male subjects aged 8 to 17, Foley et al. 
conducted interviews of the children and their parents on four occasions. On each occasion, 
indications of recent history (past 3 months) of conduct disorder are surveyed, and a history of 
exposure to environmental adversities and DNA are collected on occasions 3 and 4. Foley et al.’s 
research approach does not survey the variables that construct the maltreatment index applied by 
the GE approach. Instead, conduct disorder is measured in terms of parental neglect, exposure to 
interparental violence, and inconsistent parental discipline65. Foley et al. did not did not find that 
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low MAOA correlates with conduct disorder, and this was regardless of childhood exposure to 
violence.66 
The results of other similar but distinct GE approaches are mixed,67 highlighting potential 
issues of incommensurability that Longino cite,s given the absence of an agreed upon “best” set 
of methodological assumptions.  
Additionally, there are assumptions about alternative causal influences that can affect the 
magnitudes of the probability values involved in predictions. For example, a child's MAOA 
genotype might be related to the chance of experiencing physical abuse indirectly via an 
association with parental characteristics that increase environmental risk exposure.68 The GE 
prediction assumes children with low MAOA and severe childhood mistreatment exhibiting 
higher levels of reported aggressive behaviour do not disproportionately have parents who 
exhibit anti-social behaviour.  
Fortunately, research approaches can and often do draw upon complementary research 
approaches in order to independently justify the background assumptions they use. One such 
approach performed by Kim-Cohen and colleagues, which I dub the Meta-Genetic 
Environmental approach (MGE), employs a meta-analysis.69 Meta-analysis is a tool for 
determining whether a finding surmounts the limitations and differences across studies by 
pooling data to detect affects while avoiding overemphasis of estimates from any one study.70 
Meta-analysis continues to be a powerful method in the study of human behaviour.  
Studies were included in the meta-analysis according to the criteria set by the MGE 
approach. The criteria are as follows: (1) the study must be published in a peer-reviewed journal; 
(2) the study must include genotypic information on the “variable number tandem repeat 
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polymorphism” (a type of DNA sequence) in the promoter region of the MAOA gene; (3) the 
study includes a measure of serious familial adversity in childhood that is significantly 
associated in a main effect fashion with the outcome measure; (4) the sample of each study is 
drawn from a non-clinical population. Included in the five studies that meet the meta-analysis 
criteria is the GE approach study. 
Using standard methods to convert results of different studies into a common metric and to 
assess heterogeneity,71 the preliminary meta-analysis from the five studies conducted by the 
MGE approach finds supportive evidence of the GE approach’s results – an association 
between early familial adversity and mental health was significantly stronger in the low-
activity MAOA vs the high-activity MAOA groups. This remained the case (to a slightly 
lesser degree) when the GE study was removed from the meta-analysis, and also when it and a 
study reporting even stronger association were both removed.  
These meta-analyses suggest that across similar research approaches and their respective 
methodological assumptions (both dependently and independently of the GE approach), the 
association between maltreatment and aggressive behaviour is significantly stronger in the 
group of males with the genotype conferring low (rather than high) MAOA activity. 
Researchers have also tested the assumption that children with low MAOA, experiences 
of severe childhood mistreatment, and who exhibit higher levels of aggressive behavior, also 
disproportionately have parents who exhibit anti-social behaviour. For example, Foley et al. 
found a significant correlation between child exposure to adversities and antisocial personality 
symptoms in the childrens’ mothers. This is consistent with their expectation that antisocial 
personality is associated with poor parenting. And adjusting for the main effects of the child’s 
MAOA genotype, the child’s level of exposure to adversity, and maternal antisocial personality 
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symptoms, did not lower the magnitude or the statistical significance of the association between 
conduct disorder and the interaction between MAOA activity and adversity.72  
These are just some of the great many examples of auxiliary assumptions being 
independently justified by neighbouring research programs. Longino is well aware of these 
practices. But her regress argument implies that in many cases of applying the Likelihood 
Principle, such practices could go on ad infinitum, and that this is a problem for an objectivist 
interpretation of applications of that principle. 
Section 4.2: Response to the Longino Objection 
To respond, I will argue against premise 1 in the regress argument. While I accept that 
justifications often could in principle go on ad infinitum, I deny that this undermines the type of 
objectivity I have endorsed. 
There is a distinction between kinds objectivity available in science.73 One kind of 
objectivity is about the content involved in scientific reasoning - the particular contents of the 
concepts, theories, assumptions employed in science and their respective justifications. This is 
the kind of objectivity Longino’s regress argument addresses. In effect, she is saying that just 
when you think you have objectively supported the content of one auxiliary assumption, there 
will be another you are depending upon and which in turn needs its contents justified in order for 
initial justification to objectively hold. But there is another kind of objectivity – one that I have 
argued for and which concerns the form of evidential reasoning according to the Likelihood 
Principle. If we assume O accurately represents the world as intended and O is in fact more 
probable according to H2+Auxil2 than to H1+Auxil1, then even if the contents of the auxiliary 
assumptions paired with the hypotheses are not (as Longino would have it) objectively 
supported, the three-place favouring relation that holds between O and H2+Auxil2 and 
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H1+Auxil1 would objectively hold. For this reason, Longino’s likely objection would miss the 
mark.   
Conclusion 
I acknowledge there are important debates to be had about the many parts to science, and 
about values that often do and must play significant roles in those parts. For instance, it has long 
been widely acknowledged that values influence which research questions are asked in the first 
place, which hypotheses are tested, which tests are used, and so also which observations are 
gathered, and so on. When values influence such parts of scientific processes, they sometimes 
can change background assumptions and descriptions of observations. This can lead to changes 
in estimates of the magnitudes of Pr(O|H1+Auxil1) and Pr(O|H2+Auxil2) in particular cases. But 
those are issues about the estimations of the contents of particular applications of the Likelihood 
Principle, not about the form evidential favouring itself. I focus on the form of such favouring 
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